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Abstract
Small ￿rm lending has historically been very costly because of the paucity of infor-
mation. We study the disproportionate impact of ￿nancial development (measured as
the current level of a ￿nancial system) and ￿nancial innovation (measured as its change)
on small ￿rm sectors. We incorporate ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial development
into a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model. Entrepreneurial skill on a continuum
of types is private information; thereby creating adverse selection problems. In the
absence of ￿nancial innovation, an arrival of new technology frontier renders existing
screening technology obsolete; thereby having largely negative impacts on small ￿rm
sectors. Our model suggests that ￿nancial innovation is more pronounced in small-
￿rm sectors in more ￿nancially developed countries. The linkage between ￿nancial
innovation and the disproportionate impact on small ￿rm-sectors is weak in less ￿nan-
cially developed countries. At the European industry level, empirical evidence is more
consistent with our model prediction.
JEL codes : G2, L11, L25, O1
Key words : ￿rm size distribution, ￿nancial innovation, ￿nancial development,
contract theory , economic growth
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1Introduction
During the past several decades, technological innovation has permitted ￿nancial interme-
diaries to interact with real sectors more e¢ ciently. Particularly, to ￿nance new entrepre-
neurial projects, such innovation has promoted more e⁄ective risk management. Much of
the research on ￿nance and growth has been devoted to empirical investigation of the impact
of ￿nancial innovation (measured as a change in ￿nancial systems) on growth (Jayaratne
and Strahan, 1996; Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 2007). A
recent theoretical development (Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine, 2010) has ￿ eshed out
a linkage between ￿nancial innovation and growth across countries. In the model, ￿nan-
cial entrepreneurs innovate to maximize their pro￿t. In the absence of successful ￿nancial
innovation, an arrival of new technology frontier renders the previous screening technol-
ogy obsolete. In essence, it dampens growth. Yet, there are less theoretical developments
which capture the issue within countries. This paper attempts to model a linkage between
technological innovation and ￿nancial innovation across ￿rms and across sectors.
The empirical evidence that motivates this paper originated in two recent works on
corporate ￿nance. Peterson and Rajan (2002) ￿nds evidence that ￿nancial innovation has
increased credit availability for small ￿rms. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) provides
evidence in favor of the disproportionate impact of ￿nancial development (measured as a
current level of ￿nancial systems) on small ￿rms. Small ￿rms lending has historically been
very costly because of the paucity of information. As regards to the ￿ndings, ￿nancial
innovation would disproportionately bene￿t sectors (or ￿rms) which are more information-
ally opaque and more ￿nancially constrained. This is a main issue which this paper aims to
address. We speci￿cally focus on the interaction between ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial
development on sectoral growth, based on a size distribution of ￿rms. We ￿nd empirical ev-
idence that ￿nancial innovation has large impacts on small-￿rm sectors in more ￿nancially
2developed countries. The linkage between ￿nancial innovation and the disproportionate
impact on small ￿rm-sectors is weak in less ￿nancially developed countries.
In this paper, we incorporate ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial development into a
Schumpeterian growth model with a continuum of entrepreneurial skill types in R&D
sectors. The economy consists of investors, ￿nancial entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs and
producers. An entrepreneur starts up a research venture by borrowing R&D funds from
an investor. A successful entrepreneur invents a design for new intermediate goods and
earns pro￿ts by selling its in￿nitely lived patent to a monopoly producer. Skill is private
information, creating adverse selection problems for the investor who in turn designs a
truth-telling mechanism. R&D investments and debt repayments increase in skill on the
optimal mechanism, thereby making entrepreneurs reveal their true types. 1 The low
skilled types are more ￿nancially constrained. The investor confronts a scaled reduction of
expected pro￿ts in order to maintain incentive compatibility on optimal mechanism. As in
Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine (2010), we assume technological progress makes existing
screening devices obsolete. In the absence of ￿nancial innovation, the current level of the
￿nancial system (￿nancial development) becomes outdated and thus is unable to allocate
R&D funds to potential entrepreneurs, thereby exacerbating the adverse selection problem.
To resolve the problem, ￿nancial entrepreneurs invent new screening devices by maximizing
their monopoly pro￿ts (by competing other ￿nancial entrepreneurs). In the model, the
￿nancial entrepreneur is more active in sectors (or ￿rms) more su⁄ered by capital market
imperfection because successful innovation increases his monopoly pro￿t. Hence the larger
in sectors is asymmetric information, the more pronounced is a role of ￿nancial innovation
in growth. As in Lucas(1978), we use ￿rm size as a proxy for entrepreneurial skill by viewing
1As in previous literatures (e.g., King and Levine,1993a), the low skilled type allures to the high skilled
type on a pooling equilibrium. On a separating equilibrium, R&D investments and debt repayments
increase in skill to maintain incentive compatibility.
3the innovation skill of the entrepreneur as a manifestation of managerial e¢ ciency.2 We
derive the rate of ￿nancial innovation that are more crucial in sectors with the low mean
(via increasing R&D investment and productivity) and the more dispersion (via reducing
the severity of adverse selection) on a size distribution of ￿rms.
Recent research represents the relationship between growth and a size distribution of
￿rms. Pagano and Schivardi (2003) suggests the positive and robust relationship between
average ￿rm size and growth. Plehn-Dujowich (2009) addresses the negative and robust
relationship between the dispersion of ￿rm size and growth via the severity of adverse
selection. We are however interested in examining the link between ￿rm size, ￿nancial
innovation and its impact on growth. Unlike Plehn-Dujowich (2009), technological progress
in our model has largely negative impacts on small ￿rm sectors; thereby making the role
of ￿nancial innovation in the sectors more pronounced.3
In this paper, we document two results: ￿rst, the rate of ￿nancial innovation decreases
in skill mean. The low skilled type presents low R&D productivity, thereby being more
￿nancially constrained. The high demand of ￿nancial innovation (by investors) occurs in
the sectors which are mainly composed of the low skilled types. Because monopoly rents
to a successful ￿nancial entrepreneur increase, the rate of ￿nancial innovation increases in
the sector. Second, the rate of ￿nancial innovation increases in the dispersion of skill dis-
tribution within the sectors of same skill on average. The intuition is that the greater the
dispersion of the skill distribution, the larger the informational rents will be to maintain
the high type incentive compatibility ; thus the higher the demand of ￿nancial innova-
tion. Because skill determines ￿rm size, the results indicate ￿nancial innovation is more
2There is ample evidence that large ￿rms have better managerial ability (Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982
) and perform more R&Ds studies (Griliches, 1984; Cohen, Levin, and Mowery, 1987 ).
3Plehn-Dujowich (2009) assumes innovation technology is exogenous. Hence technological progress
causes more distortions on small ￿rm sectors (and more size-dispersed sectors) than in Plehn-Dujowich
(2009).
4pronounced in small-￿rm sectors and more size-dispersed sectors within small ￿rm sectors.
One distinctive feature of the model is the high skilled types more easily adapt to
the technology frontier than the low skilled types, because of complementarity between
skill level and technology frontier. In the absence of ￿nancial innovation, technological
progress makes it more challenging for an investor to maintain incentive compatibility;
thereby leading to more distortions in small ￿rm sectors (and more size dispersed sectors).
This does not only impede technological innovation, but also dampen the rate of change
in technological innovation in the sectors. The more severe the distortion in the sectors,
the more pronounced the role of ￿nancial innovation in growth will be. Because the high
skilled types more contribute technological innovation by revealing their true types, the only
investor who owns new screening devices takes full advantage of technological innovation.
In the absence of ￿nancial development, however, inventing ￿nancial innovation itself
does not largely bene￿t small ￿rm sectors (more size-dispersed sectors). The cost to inno-
vate new screening methodology decreases in the current level of ￿nancial systems. Facing
identical adverse selection problems, ￿nancial entrepreneurs in more ￿nancially developed
countries can be more active in innovation. In the model, on the one hand, the rate ￿-
nancial innovation increases in small ￿rm sectors (and more size-dispersed sectors) because
of high monopoly pro￿ts to ￿nancial entrepreneurs. The more distortion ￿nancial innova-
tion resolves, the more technological innovation per ￿nancial innovation is achieved in the
sectors. On the other hand, technological innovation is initially more dampened in the sec-
tors. 4 Unless the innovation cost is su¢ ciently low so that the bene￿t dominates the cost,
￿nancial innovation does not have a disproportionate impact on small ￿rm sectors (and
more size-dispersed sectors), but rather large ￿rm sectors (and less size-dispersed sectors).
4In Plehn-Dujowich (2009), an increase in the mean skill enhances growth via increasing R&D produc-
tivity and investment (referred as the positive scale e⁄ect). An increase in the skill dispersion dampens
growth via increasing the severity of adverse selection (referred as the negative adverse selection e⁄ect).
These are general properties in the absence of ￿nancial innovation.
5This is a main discriminating feature of the model.
Though the major contribution of this paper is the theoretical development, we present
empirical evidence to support our model prediction. To test our main proposition, we
perform cross-sector, cross-country empirical studies by using 22 sectors spanning 24 Eu-
ropean countries, over the sample period 2002-2006. The dataset allows us to examine
the 2002 cross-￿rm, cross-sector distributional e⁄ect of ￿nancial development and ￿nancial
innovation on the average 2002-2006 growth. We use a size distribution of ￿rms (FSD) as a
proxy for entrepreneurial skill distribution, wherein ￿rm size is measured by employment.
Hence the severity of adverse selection is measured by a standard deviation of the FSD.
We ￿nd evidence in favor of our prediction : In the absence of ￿nancial development, the
interaction between ￿nancial innovation and the mean (the standard deviation) of the FSD
enters positively (negatively) and signi￿cantly; suggesting that ￿nancial innovation largely
helps large ￿rm sectors (and less size-dispersed sectors). However, the interaction between
￿nancial development, ￿nancial innovation and the mean (the standard deviation) of the
FSD enters negatively (positively) and signi￿cantly. Financial innovation has a dispropor-
tionate impact on small ￿rm sectors (and more size-dispersed sectors) in more ￿nancially
developed countries. All of our empirical results are robust even when we control for
other industrial traits and use alternative measures of ￿nancial intermediary development.
Despite a short sample period (2002 to 2006), the results strongly suggest that the interac-
tion between ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial development is very crucial for cross-sector,
cross-￿rm growth. Our empirical analysis di⁄ers from the previous literatures (Pagano and
Schivardi, 2003; Plehn-Dujowich, 2009; Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine, 2010) by ￿rst
attempting to estimate the impact of ￿nancial innovation on sectoral growth relating to
the mean and the standard deviation of a size distribution of ￿rms.
The debate on the relationship between growth and ￿nance is about as old as growth
6theory itself. Schumpeter (1911) argued that ￿nancial systems are important in promoting
innovations; economies with more e¢ cient ￿nancial systems grow faster. Despite disagree-
ment about the role of the ￿nancial system in economic growth (Robinson , 1952 ; Lucas,
1988), a substantial body of works has shown that an economy￿ s ￿nancial system is posi-
tively correlated with its future growth in per capita, real income. (Goldsmith, 1969 ; King
and Levine, 1993b ; Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2004 and 2005). With regards to
cross-sector, cross-￿rm growth, recent empirical studies o⁄er insight about ￿nancial devel-
opment and ￿rm growth, based on ￿rm sizes. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) and
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008) present empirical evidence that ￿nancial
development exerts a disproportionate impact on small ￿rms. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (2005) shows that ￿nancial and institutional development helps small ￿rms
by weakening ￿nancial and legal constraints. As regards to a change in ￿nancial systems,
Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2007) ￿nds empirical evidence that the deregulation of
the French banking industry in the 1980s improved asset allocative e¢ ciency across ￿rms.
These results are in the line with our empirical investigation. We emphasize more on the
fact that a positive linkage between ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial development helps
small ￿rms.
At the theoretical standpoint, this paper closely relates to Greenwood, Sanchez and
Wang (2010) by attempting to allow a change of the ￿nancial system as the economy
develops. This study, however, is di⁄erent from our work in the sense that ￿nancial in-
termediaries choose their monitoring technology , not by competing with other capable
￿nancial intermediaries. The model does not leave any chance for the relationship between
investors and ￿nancial entrepreneurs to be severed at any point in time and seek better
partners. Ultimately, the rate of ￿nancial innovation is not fully determined by the choices
of pro￿t maximizing agents.
7One limitation of our analysis is that we de￿ne ￿nance narrowly. We examine on the
role of the ￿nancial system in screening innovative activities and mitigating asymmetric
information problems. We do not model risk diversi￿cation, pooling, and trading. However,
our paper attempts to emphasize on a role of creative destruction of the ￿nancial system
itself in cross-sector, cross-￿rm growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows, Section 2 outlines the basic struc-
tures and theoretical model. Section 3 presents empirical evidences. The last section
concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 The Environment
We follow Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine (2010) by introducing heterogenous entrepre-
neurs in terms of their R&D productivity. There are M countries which do not exchange
goods or factors but do make use of each other￿ s technological ideas. We assume that there
are the cross-country di⁄erences in ￿nancial development, in terms of the cost to innovate
￿nancial systems. In each country, the economy consists of i industries that consist of
multiple product line, where i 2 [0;1]. There are four types of agents in each country
: households, entrepreneurs, ￿nancial entrepreneurs and producers. Each household lives
two periods and endowed with three units of labor in the ￿rst period and nothing in the
second period. In the ￿rst period, he is hired by the ￿nal goods ￿rm, earning the competi-
tive wage wt. In the second period, he becomes a risk-neutral investor who provides R&D
funds to promising entrepreneurs. The utility function is linear in consumptions so that
U = c1 + ￿c2 where 0 < ￿ < 1.5
5Linear utility implies that people are indi⁄erent between investing in any country. We assume that all
investment is locally ￿nanced, but if ￿ were the same across all countries, we could allow perfect capital
8In every period, there is a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs in each intermediate
good sector are indexed by a skill level s drawn from the distribution F with the support
[s;s], where s ￿ 1. Let ms and ￿2
s denote the mean and variance, respectively, of the
entrepreneurial skill distribution. The skill distribution itself is exogenous: we do not
consider the e⁄ect of ￿nance on the acquisition of skills. Each entrepreneur has the idea
and know-how to start up a research venture that produces new innovation for the sector
but lacks the fund, thereby borrowing it from the investor. Entrepreneurial skill is private
information, thereby creating an adverse selection problem for the investor. To resolve
the problem, the investor designs a truth-telling compatible mechanism by using available
￿nancially screening devices. Because entrepreneurs and the research venture they create
exist for one period, the investor does not face repeated adverse selection. When an
entrepreneur succeeds to invent new technology in the sector, he receives an in￿nitely-
lived patent granting it monopoly rights over the intermediate good. He earns pro￿ts by
selling it to a monopolist that manufactures and sells it to the ￿nal good ￿rm.
In each sector, ￿nancial entrepreneurs innovate screening methodology and provide it
for the investor. A ￿nancial entrepreneur can earn monopoly rents by successfully inventing
a better screening technology than competitor ￿nancial entrepreneurs. In the absence of
successful ￿nancial innovation, existing screening devices become less e⁄ective as technology
advances. Successful ￿nancial entrepreneurs are paid by the investor in the form of a share
of the investor￿ s pro￿ts.
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of each period t￿1, a household so-
licits ￿nancial entrepreneurs to innovate screening methodology. The ￿nancial entrepreneur
borrows a loan from the household and starts ￿nancial innovation. At the next period, the
household lends R&D funds to screened entrepreneurs who innovate and repay the funds.
mobility without change in the analysis.
9The household will pay a share of his expected pro￿t to the ￿nancial entrepreneur. If
possible, the ￿nancial entrepreneur pay back to the household.
Within each sector in each country, the growth path is determined as follows.
2.2 Final good sectors
In every period, a competitive ￿rm purchases intermediate goods and hires production
workers to manufacture the ￿nal goods according to the following production technology:
Yt = L￿
1 Z
0
At(i)￿xt(i)1￿￿di (1)
where 0 < ￿ < 1. xt(i) is the input of the latest version of intermediate good in a
sector i and At(i) is the productivity parameter associated with it. L is labor supply which
is normalized to unity. The ￿nal good Yt is used for consumptions, as an input into the
production of intermediate goods. The ￿nal good is produced under perfect competition.
The pro￿t maximization problem in this sector is
max
L;xt(i)
L￿
1 Z
0
At(i)￿xt(i)1￿￿di ￿ wL ￿
1 Z
0
pt(i)xt(i)di
The wage is determined by
wt = ￿
1 Z
0
At(i)￿xt(i)1￿￿di = ￿Yt (Assume L = 1) (2)
The price of each intermediate good equals its marginal product
10pt(i) = (1 ￿ ￿)At(i)￿xt(i)￿￿ (3)
(3) is the inverse demand for intermediate good in the sector i
2.3 Intermediate good sectors
In each intermediate good i, there is a continuum of entrepreneurs who has the idea and
know-how to start up a research venture. After inventing new innovation, they sell the
right to their in￿nitely-lived patents to monopolists that manufacture the intermediate
goods at constant marginal cost c. The ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts by taking into account of
the demand function (3). The quantity of demand in the sector i is
xt(i) = (
(1 ￿ ￿)2
c
)
1
￿At(i), (4)
It follows that the pro￿t of the innovator will be ￿t(i) = (
￿c
1￿￿)(
(1￿￿)2
c )
1
￿At(i) in next
period. Each entrepreneur who is indexed by skill s, where s 2 [s;s], s > 1, adopts his
productivity level, de￿ned as,
At(i) =
￿
At with probability ￿i
t(s)
At￿1(i) with probability 1 ￿ ￿i
t(s)
￿
(5)
where At is the world technology frontier, which grows at the constant rate g > 0, taken
as given. The ith innovator with high ￿i
t(s) is more likely to adopt the world technology
frontier and invent high-quality innovation. We assume that there is only 1 leading country
whereby its productivity is same as At. Other m￿1 countries invest on R&D to catch up
11to the leading technology frontier.
2.4 Financial entrepreneurs
A ￿nancial entrepreneur innovates ￿nancially screening devices by facing technological in-
novation in intermediate good sectors. Every period, they borrow funds from households
and provide update methodology to screen promising individuals with entrepreneurial ideas
for the next period. In each sector, there are unlimited of people capable of inventing new
￿nancial methodology with the probability ￿
f
t (i). The only ￿nancial entrepreneur who
successfully innovates in sector i in period t ￿ 1, will provide update screening devices for
investors. He receives a fraction of expected entrepreneurial pro￿ts ￿t which is endoge-
nously determined in the model. Financial entrepreneurs who fail to innovate in the sector
i receives no pro￿t. In the absence of the services, the investors screen individuals with
entrepreneurial ideas by using the existent screening devices, thereby losing expected prof-
its. The successful ￿nancial entrepreneur charges a price such that the investor indi⁄erent
between using the new screening devices and using the existent screening devices. For
simplicity, we assume that the perfect competitive fringe can provide the existent screen-
ing devices at zero cost. The entrepreneurs screened by using the competitive fringe of
￿nancial entrepreneurs keep 100% of pro￿ts.
2.5 Innovation and Aggregate Growth
2.5.1 Entrepreneurial Innovation
An entrepreneur creates and runs a research venture ￿nanced by an investor. Each en-
trepreneur is indexed by a skill level s, drawn from the distribution F with the support
[s;s], where s > 1, s < 1. The entrepreneur adopts new technology as follows : when the
investor provides It in R&D funding, the entrepreneur invents new technology with the
12innovation probability function : ￿E
t (It;s) = (￿s1+g)1￿￿(
It(s)
At )￿ where ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿ > 0,
the target frontier technology level At. The term
It(s)
At is an e¢ cient investment level
whereby the further ahead the frontier moves, the more di¢ cult it is to innovate. By
s > 1, the term ￿s1+g includes the entrepreneurial skill level whereby high skill entre-
preneurs are more easily to adopt technology frontier. The market value of the ￿rm is
V (It;s) = ￿t￿E
t (It;s) = ￿t(￿s1+g)1￿￿(
It(s)
At )￿ where ￿t is the payo⁄ per innovation that ac-
crues to the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial skill and investments in R&D are complements
in innovation process.
Because skill is private information to the entrepreneur, the investor designs a loan
contract that compels the entrepreneur to reveal his true type of skill by maintaining in-
centive compatibility and voluntarily participate in the contract by maintaining individual
rationality. Due to the revelation principle, the household may restrict his attention to
truthful mechanisms in which the message space is restricted to be the private information
possessed by the entrepreneur, namely his skill level. When the research project is com-
plete, the entrepreneur earns the market value of ￿rm V (It;s) and makes debt payment
D(It;s). The outside option of the entrepreneur is to become a production worker earning
the competitive wage wt. The expected income of the investor, conditional on the signal,
is
UE(Dt(s);It(s);s) = V (It(s);s) ￿ Dt(s), (6)
and the expected income of the entrepreneur, conditional on the signal, is
UI(Dt(s);It(s)) = Dt(s) ￿ It(s). (7)
13The household￿ s mechanism design problem is
max
Dt(s);It(s)
Z s
s
[Dt(s) ￿ It(s)]dF(s), (8)
subject to the participation constraint of the entrepreneur
V (It(s);s) ￿ Dt(s) ￿ wt for all s 2 [s;s]; (9)
the truth-telling constraint of the entrepreneur
V (It(s);s) ￿ Dt(s) ￿ V (It(e s);s) ￿ Dt(e s) for all s;e s 2 [s;s]; (10)
and the non-negativity constraint It(s) ￿ 0.
Let ￿(s) = [1 ￿ F(s)]=f(s) denote the inverse of the hazard rate of F. As is common
in the mechanism design literature, we assume
￿0(s) ￿ 0 and ￿(s) = 0 (A 1)
Lemma 1 The mechanism design problem is equivalent to having the investor maximizes
the "virtual surplus" of the research venture:
max
It(s)￿0
V (It(s);s) ￿ It(s) ￿ ￿(s)Vs(It(s);s) (11)
The solutions to this problem is described by (11) in the absence of ￿nancial innovation
are as follows: (1) the R&D investment policy is
It(s) = ￿s1+gf
￿￿t
A
￿
t
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]g1=(1￿￿) (12)
14(2) the expected innovation probability is
￿t(s) = ￿s1+gf(￿￿t=At)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]g￿=(1￿￿) (13)
(3) the expected value of the ￿rm is
Vt(s) = ￿s1+g￿
1=(1￿￿)
t f￿=At[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]g￿=(1￿￿) (14)
The participation constraint of the lowest-skilled entrepreneur binds:
Dt(s) = Vt(s) ￿ ￿At (15)
The term ￿(s)Vs(It(s);s) in equation (11) quanti￿es the impact of the adverse selection
problem on the social surplus. This measures the extent to which the investor￿ s objective
deviates from the social surplus of the research venture V (It(s);s) ￿ It(s), which is the
investor￿ s objective in the absence of the adverse selection problem.6 Because of the single-
crossing property VsI > 0, the term ￿(s)Vs(It(s);s) is increasing in the investment It.
An upward shift in the function over the range [s;s] or a reduction in the skill level of
the entrepreneur under assumption (A1) increases the inverse of hazard rate ￿(s) itself,
thereby exacerbating the adverse selection problem. Furthermore, the more is technology
advances at a growth rate g, the more the investor￿ s objective deviation from the social
surplus, the greater the distortion caused by the adverse selection problem will be.
Lemma 1 requires that the investment policy is non-increasing in skill on the optimal
mechanism. A su¢ cient, but not necessary condition, for this to hold is (A1). To satisfy
the second-order condition (SOC) of the investor￿ s problem, and ensure the investment
6The second best solution under perfect informaton is obtained by solving maxIt(s)￿0 V (It(s);s)￿It(s)
subject to the participatiion constraint. The second best R&D investment is It(s) = ￿s
1+g(
￿￿t
A
￿
t
)
1=(1￿￿).
15policy (12) is well de￿ned, we must assume 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s > 0 for all s 2 [s;s].
Under assumption (A1), this condition becomes 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s > 0.
2.5.2 Financial Innovation
In each sector, a ￿nancial entrepreneur borrows funds from households and invests in ￿nan-
cial innovation to screen individuals with entrepreneurial ideas for technological innovation
in next period. The probability that the capable ￿nancial entrepreneur in sector i success-
fully innovates, ￿
f
t (i) depends positively on the quality of resources invested in ￿nancial
innovation in period t ￿ 1, I
f
t￿1(i) = ￿f(￿
f
t (i))2, whereby the more ￿nancially developed
country is, the lower ￿f is. In other words, the cost of ￿nancial innovation positively relates
the probability of successful ￿nancial innovation and negatively relates the country￿ s level
of ￿nancial development.
If the ￿nancial entrepreneur successfully innovates, then new screening methodology
stops the process of exacerbating adverse selection problems as technology frontier ad-
vances. If the ￿nancial entrepreneur fails to innovate, the degree of adverse selection
increases, thereby dampening the investment decision in R&D funding.
In equilibrium, in the sector, each intermediate good is produced in the amount
xt(i) = [(1 ￿ ￿)2=c]1=￿At(i). (16)
Since the successful entrepreneurial pro￿t is ￿t = (
￿c
1￿￿)(
(1￿￿)2
c )
1
￿At with the probability
￿t(s), in the absence of ￿nancial innovation, the equilibrium innovation probability function
is
￿t(s) = ￿s1+gf￿￿[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]g￿=(1￿￿) (17)
16where ￿ = (
￿c
1￿￿)(
(1￿￿)2
c )
1
￿. The term (1+g)￿(s)=s captures the distortion of the degree
of adverse selection in innovation process caused by the growth of technology frontier. By
s > 1, the high skilled more easily adopts new technology frontier than the low skilled.
By this property, technology progress has more a disproportionately negative impact on
on sectors which mainly consists of low skilled types in the absence of ￿nancial innovation.
This does not only impede technological innovation, but also dampens the rate of change
in technological innovation in the sectors. This also more dampens the rate of change in
technological innovation in the more skill dispersed sectors.7 To resolve the adverse selec-
tion problem, we add a role of ￿nancial innovation to the innovation probability function
by reforming (17) as:
￿J
t (s) = ￿s1+gf￿￿[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=(￿ts)]g￿=(1￿￿) (18)
where
￿t(i) =
￿
(1 + g) with probability ￿
f
t (i) (J = s)
1 with probability 1 ￿ ￿
f
t (i) (J = u)
￿
In the absence of successful ￿nancial innovation (J = u), ￿t = 1 , and thus technological
progress causes more distortions in the adverse selection problem. With successful ￿nancial
innovation (J = s), ￿t = 1 +g , and thus there is no more distortion in the adverse selection
problem by technological progress. The new equilibrium value of ￿rm is
V J
t (s) = ￿s1+g￿1=(1￿￿)f￿[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=(￿ts)]g￿=(1￿￿) (19)
7The mathematical proof is given in the appendix.
17For the successful ￿nancial entrepreneur, the investor pays the fraction of the entre-
preneurial pro￿t ￿t such that the investor is indi⁄erent between making a contract with
successful ￿nancial innovation and with unsuccessful ￿nancial innovation. The ￿nancial en-
trepreneur￿ s pro￿t ￿t is equal to
s Z
s
￿t(s)V s
i;t(s)dF(s) where ￿t(s)(V s
t (s)￿Is
t (s)￿￿(s)V s
s ) =
V u
t (s) ￿ Iu
t (s) ￿ ￿(s)V u
s , and thus ￿t(s) = 1 ￿ [
1￿(1￿￿)(1+g)￿(s)=s
1￿(1￿￿)￿(s)=s ]1=(1￿￿). This equation
indicates that the better role of successful ￿nancial innovation is in resolving the adverse
selection problem, the higher the ￿nancial entrepreneur￿ s pro￿t is.
The ￿nancial entrepreneur chooses ￿
f
t (i) to maximize his expected pro￿t ￿
f
t (i) =
￿
f
t (i)￿
s Z
s
￿t(s)V s
i;t(s)dF(s). The probability ￿
f
t (i) to maximize ￿
f
t (i) is
￿
f
t (i) =
￿
s Z
s
￿t(s)V s
i;t(s)dF(s)
2￿f
=
f
￿￿(￿￿)1=(1￿￿)
s Z
s
s1+g[f[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s]g￿=(1￿￿)
￿f[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]g￿=(1￿￿)dF(s)
g
2￿f (20)
The rate of ￿nancial innovation ￿
f
t (i) is decreasing in ￿f : the higher is the country￿ s
level of ￿nancial development, the higher is the rate of ￿nancial innovation. Under identical
asymmetric information, a ￿nancial entrepreneur can choose a higher rate of ￿nancial in-
novation in more ￿nancially developed countries. The following lemma shows how the rate
of ￿nancial innovation changes in regards to properties of entrepreneurial skill distribution.
Lemma 2 Assume (A1) holds. Consider the entrepreneurial skill distribution G and H
with the support [s;s], where s > 1, s < 1. Let ￿
f
t (G) denotes the rate of ￿nancial
18innovation associated with G and ￿
f
t (H) denotes the rate of ￿nancial innovation associated
with H.
(1) Suppose H ￿rst-order stochastically dominates G; then ￿
f
t (G) ￿ ￿
f
t (H) if ￿ > ￿(s),
where ￿(s) = max[￿
s￿￿(s)
￿0(s)s ], s 2 [s;s].
(2) Suppose H second-order stochastically dominates G; then ￿
f
t (G) ￿ ￿
f
t (H) if ￿ ￿ 1=2
, s > (1 + g)=(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿00(s) ￿ 0.
The ￿rst part of the lemma indicates that the rate of ￿nancial innovation decreases
in skill mean. The low skilled type presents low R&D productivity, thereby being more
￿nancially constrained. The high demand of ￿nancial innovation (by investors) occurs in
the sectors which are mainly composed of the low skilled types. The high demand for
￿nancial innovation in the sectors leads to an increase in monopoly rents to a successful
￿nancier, thereby raising the rate of ￿nancial innovation. The su¢ cient, but not necessary,
condition ￿ > ￿(s) implies that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation becomes trivial, as ￿ ! 0
, because R&D investment becomes trivial for technological innovation. The second part
of the lemma implies that the rate of ￿nancial innovation increases in dispersion of skill
distribution within the sectors of the same skill on average.8 The greater is the dispersion
of the skill distribution, the large is the informational advantage of skilled types; thus
the higher is the demand of investors for ￿nancial innovation. The requirement ￿ ￿ 1=2 ,
s > (1+g)=(1￿￿) and ￿00(s) ￿ 0 are su¢ cient, but not necessary, conditions for the second
property of the lemma 2. The requirement ￿00(s) ￿ 0 is satis￿ed if the entrepreneurial skill
distribution is uniform, exponential, or Pareto. The condition s > (1+g)=(1￿￿) excludes
a case that an advance in technology frontier outpaces ￿nancial innovation.
8In the second part of lemma 1, the statement " H second-order stochastically dominates G." is equivalent
to the statement " G is a mean preserving spread of H.", thereby suggesting that "more dispersed small
￿rm sectors are more informationally opaque."
192.5.3 Aggregate Economic Activity
This section aggregates an economy￿ s activity at the industry level and examines its compo-
nents. We de￿ne each sector￿ s average level of productivity, At =
R 1
0 At(i)di where aggrega-
tion is performed across the continuum of intermediate sectors. In aggregate equilibrium,
the probability of innovation in R&D sectors, ￿J
t (i) =
s Z
s
￿J
t (s)dF(s) for all i 2 [0;1] where
J = s;u. At the aggregate level, the rate of ￿nancial innovation is ￿
f
t =
R 1
0 ￿
f
t (i)di for all
i 2 [0;1]. Since we aggregate ￿nancial e¢ ciency across a continuum of sectors, we ignore
negligible relative size di⁄erences. The average technology productivity evolves according
to
At = f￿
f
t ￿s
t + (1 ￿ ￿
f
t )￿u
t gAt + f￿
f
t (1 ￿ ￿s
t) + (1 ￿ ￿
f
t )(1 ￿ ￿u
t )gAt￿1 (21)
At the industry level, the average technology productivity in period t is a weighted
average of sectors with the technology frontier At and of sectors with the previous average
technology productivity At￿1. The weight depends on the rate of ￿nancial innovation(￿
f
t ),
the rate of entrepreneurial innovation by using new screening devices (￿s
t) and the rate of
entrepreneurial innovation by using previous screening devices (￿u
t ). Hence the weight is
indirectly a⁄ected by the properties of entrepreneurial skill distribution.
In ￿nal good sectors, the competitive wage wt is ￿(
(1￿￿)2
c )
1￿￿
￿ At and Yt = ￿At where
￿ = (
(1￿￿)2
c )
1￿￿
￿ . Denote the cross-industry distance from the world technology frontier as
at = At
At 2 (0;1). The technology gap evolves according to
at = [￿
f
t ￿s
t + (1 ￿ ￿
f
t )￿u
t ] +
￿
f
t (1 ￿ ￿s
t) + (1 ￿ ￿
f
t )(1 ￿ ￿u
t )
1 + g
at￿1 (22)
20This converges to the steady state ass in the long run :
ass =
(1 + g)(￿f(￿s ￿ ￿u) + ￿u)
g + ￿f(￿s ￿ ￿u) + ￿u (23)
The disproportionate impact of ￿nancial innovation on growth is determined by ￿f(￿s￿
￿u) and ￿u. On the one hand, the rate ￿nancial innovation (￿f) increases in sectors with
the low mean skill and the high size dispersion because of high monopoly pro￿ts to ￿nancial
entrepreneurs. The more distortion ￿nancial innovation resolves, the more technological
innovation per ￿nancial innovation (￿s ￿ ￿u) is achieved in the sectors. On the other
hand, technological innovation (￿u) is initially more dampened in the sectors. Unless
the innovation cost is su¢ ciently low so that the bene￿t dominates the cost, ￿nancial
innovation does not have a disproportionate impact on sectors with the low skill mean
(and the more skill-dispersion), but rather on sectors with the high skill mean (and the
less skill-dispersion).
The following proposition characterizes the growth of economies depending on each
country￿ s level of ￿nancial system (￿nancial development) and its change (￿nancial inno-
vation).
Proposition 1 As a country is more ￿nancially developed, then in the steady state,
(1) the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on the growth of sectors (which converge to the
leading technology frontier) decreases in the mean of entrepreneurial skill distribution.
(2) the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on the growth of sectors (which converge to the
leading technology frontier) increases in the dispersion of entrepreneurial skill distribution.
As regards to a ￿rm size, the main implication of our theory is that as a country is
more ￿nancially developed, the impact of ￿nancial innovation on growth in the steady state
21decreases in the mean of a size distribution of ￿rms and increases in the dispersion of a
size distribution of ￿rms.
We assume that the growth rate of the technology frontier is determined by the equi-
librium rate of entrepreneurial innovation in the leading industry in a leading country
1:
g = ￿
f
1(￿s
1 ￿ ￿u
1) + ￿u
1 (24)
2.6 Firm size and Financial Innovation
In the previous section, we discussed the impact of ￿nancial innovation on growth depends
on the mean and the dispersion of a size distribution of ￿rms. The ￿rst part of Lemma
1 indicates that a role of ￿nancial innovation in growth is more pronounced in small ￿rm
sectors.
Now we consider a theoretical background suggesting that ￿nancial innovation has a
disproportionately positive impacts on small ￿rms within each sector. There has been a
well-known fact that small ￿rms are more su⁄ered by costly borrowing due to a paucity of
information. Small ￿rms confront high ￿nancial and legal obstacles and severe competition
to obtain R&D resources. In our model, ￿nancial innovation plays a crucial role in the
growth of small ￿rms in a sector. This follows from the fact that the inverse of the hazard
rate is decreasing in skill under assumption (A1) ￿0(s) < 0 and ￿(s) = 0. The severity
of adverse selection decreases in skill. Therefore, the less skilled an entrepreneur, the
greater reduction in his R&D investment will be. The low skilled types are more ￿nancially
constrained. A ￿nancial entrepreneur￿ s pro￿t decreases in skill, as we see in equation (20),
the term [1￿(1￿￿)￿(s)=s]￿[1￿(1￿￿)(1+g)￿(s)=s] decreases in skill. The demand of
￿nancial innovation is high in small ￿rms in each sector. Hence, our theory predicts that
22￿nancial innovation largely bene￿ts small ￿rms in each sector.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section we confront our theoretical predictions with evidence. Because skill deter-
mines ￿rm size in our theory, we use a size distribution of ￿rms (Firm Size Distribution;
FSD) to proxy entrepreneurial skill distribution F such that average ￿rm size measures
the mean of F and the standard deviation of the FSD measures the dispersion of F, as in
Plehn-Dujowich (2009). In our regression framework, we interact sector characteristics ￿
consist of Mean, Standard Deviation of the FSD ￿ with a country￿ s characteristics ￿ the
level of Financial Development and the rate of Financial Innovation. We test the e⁄ect of
each own and interaction terms (in 2002) on the average 2002-6 growth rate of European
2-digit manufacturing sectors.9 After describing our data, we explain our test for the main
implication.
3.1 Data
This study uses an unbalanced panel of European (NACE) 2-digit manufacturing sectors
from Eurostat. The panel includes the number of ￿rms and employment by ￿rm size class,
together with investment, employment, payroll, and value added. The panel includes 22
sectors spanning 24 countries. The dataset allows us to examine the cross-￿rm, cross-sector
distributional e⁄ect of ￿nancial development and ￿nancial innovation on growth. There
are ￿ve ￿rm size classes based on the number of employees : 1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-249, and
250+. As in Ace, Morck and Yeung (1999) and Pagano and Schivardi (2003), we construct
the Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation of the FSD in 2002 by using the average ￿rm
9By considering country- and sector- ￿xed e⁄ects, we estimate the impact of ￿nancial systems on the
growth of sectors which converge to the leading technology frontier, as in our theory.
23size in a sector weighted by employment. The Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation
are considerably right-skewed, so we use their logs ( MEANi and SDi). Employment is
measured by the number of person employed. Value Added is measured by value added
at factor cost. Real Value Added per Worker (VAD) is value added divided by country-
level Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) published by Eurostat, which is then divided by
the number of persons employed. VAD is our measure of labor productivity. As in growth
literature, VAD growth relates two kinds of variables ￿ initial level of VAD (V AD2002)
and proxies for the level of physical capital and labor. We do not have a measure of the
capital stock to calculate the capital-labor ratio, we use the log of Investment instead. To
avoid multicollinearity (with the initial level of VAD), we use the log of Payroll instead.
Investment is measured by gross investment in tangible goods. . Payroll is measured by
personnel costs. Investment and payroll are also de￿ ated using PPP.
We follow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Michalopoulos, Laeven and
Levine (2010) in using the ratio of Private Credit to GDP (Fk) in 2002 as our preferred
measure of ￿nancial development. This is the value of credits by ￿nancial intermediaries
to the private sector ( excluding credit granted to the public sector and credit granted
the central bank and development bank ), divided by GDP. This is based on the theo-
retical sound notion that developed ￿nancial markets grant individuals and ￿rms easier
access to external funds. An ideal proxy for ￿nancial innovation would measure improve-
ments in ￿nancially screening devices. However, such information is not available. As in
Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine (2010), we use the growth rate of the ratio of Private
Credit to GDP (fk) over the sample period as our preferred proxy for ￿nancial innovation.
This index may be an unsatisfactory measure because it measures overall improvements in
the country￿ s ￿nancial system. Our empirical ￿nding supports, however, that the previous
empirical literature focusing on ￿nancial development underscore the value of incorporating
24its change.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of country-industry speci￿c variables and country
variables. Table 2 and 3 present country-level and sector-level means of Weighted Mean
and Standard Deviation of the FSD across the entire panel. The average Weighted Mean of
FSD is 398.55, with a median of 271.98 and the average Standard Deviation of the FSD is
281.75, with a median of 255.23. Table 2 contains the mean across sectors of the Weighted
Mean and Standard Deviation for each country. Sweden has the largest ￿rms and the
most dispersed FSD. Estonia has the smallest ￿rms and the least dispersed FSD. Table
3 contains the mean across countries of the weighted mean and standard deviation for
each sector. Motor (NACE 34) has the largest ￿rms and largely dispersed FSD. Recycling
(NACE 37) has the smallest ￿rms and the least dispersed FSD. Overall, the correlation
between the weighted mean and standard deviation is 87%.
Table 1 also presents indexes of Financial Development (Fk) and Financial Innovation
(fk). Denmark is the most ￿nancially developed country. Lithuania is the least ￿nancially
developed country. Estonia shows the most rate of ￿nancial innovation. Germany shows
the least rate of ￿nancial innovation. Overall, the correlation between Fk and fk is - 60%.
Financial innovation is high in less ￿nancially developed countries.
3.2 Methodology and results
3.2.1 Main Implication
To examine our main implication for proposition 1, we focus on the e⁄ect of two interaction
terms MEANi ￿ fk￿ Fkand SDi ￿ fk￿ Fk in 2002 on the average 2002-2006 VAD growth.
25Consider the following regression :
gi;k = ￿0 + ￿1MEANi + ￿2SDi + ￿3MEANi ￿ fk + ￿4SDi ￿ fk + ￿5MEANi ￿ fk ￿ Fk
+￿6SDi ￿ fk ￿ Fk + ￿0
XX +
X
i
￿iCountryi +
X
k
￿kIndustryk + "i;k (25)
where gi;k is the average 2002-6 log VAD growth rate in sector i and country k. The vec-
tor of other controlled regressors X contains the log of 2002 real Investment (Investment),
the log of 2002 real Payroll (Payroll) and the log of 2002 VAD (V AD2002). We do not
include ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial development on their own, since we focus on
within-country, within-industry growth rate. The dummy variables for sectors and coun-
tries control for country-and-sector speci￿c characteristics that might determine sector
growth patterns. We always report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The Financial Development index Fk and the Financial Innovation index fk may be
endogenous because feedback from growth to ￿nance, or because of the common e⁄ect of
omitted variables on both growth and ￿nance. We test our main implications by using
a various set of interaction with the instruments which contains MEANi ￿ fk, SDi ￿ fk,
MEANi￿Fk, SDi￿Fk,.MEANi￿fk ￿Fk and SDi￿fk ￿Fk. The endogeneity of Fk and fk are
likely to entail endogeneity of the interaction variables. We try to tackle the issues using
the method of instrumental variables. To deal with endogeneity problem with regard to
Fk, we estimated the equation using instrumental variables, instrumenting for MEANi￿Fk
and SDi ￿ Fk using legal origins(Lk) interacted with MEANi and SDi ( MEANi ￿ Lk and
SDi ￿ Lk respectively ). Legal origins is a set of four dummy variables for the country￿ s
legal system based on French, English, German or Scandinavian tradition, used ￿rst in La
Portra et al (1998). The variables are a good set of instruments for ￿nancial development
because they were established too long ago to escape from reverse causation.
To deal with endogeneity problem with regard to fk, we estimated the equation using
26an instrumental variable, instrumenting for fk using the average growth rate of ￿nancial
reform index (Rk) over the period 1996 to 2006, as in Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine
(2010). The ￿nancial reform index , developed by Abiad and Mody (2005), is an aggregate
index which measures the degree of policy liberalization on six policy dimensions ￿ credit
controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers in the banking sector, operational restriction,
privatization in the ￿nancial sector and restrictions on international ￿nancial transactions.
The index captures improvements in the country￿ s ￿nancial system, but is positively as well
as negatively a⁄ected by omitted factors for promoting economic growth (Chui, Titman
and Wei; 2001). For example, a successful ￿nancial reform improves the matching be-
tween entrepreneurs with good projects and capital. However, it may deter the growth in
corporate groups which have close relationships with policymakers and providers of capital
that are likely to be less valuable in a more open and less regulated environment. We esti-
mated the equation by instrumenting MEANi ￿ fk and SDi ￿ fk using reform indexes(Rk)
interacted with MEANi and SDi ( MEANi￿Rk and SDi￿Rk respectively ). We construct
the interaction terms MEANi ￿fk ￿Fk and SDi ￿fk ￿Fk by multiplying the ￿rst stage ￿tted
values of MEANi ￿ Fk and SDi ￿ Fk by the ￿rst stage ￿tted value of fk, respectively.
Our model prediction includes the positive scale e⁄ect and the negative adverse selection
e⁄ect of the FSD on growth, discussed by Pagano and Schivardi (2003) and Plehn-Dujowich
(2009) (￿1 > 0 and ￿2 < 0). In the absence of ￿nancial development, ￿nancial innovation
itself is not su¢ cient to largely bene￿t small ￿rm sectors (and more size-dispersed sectors);
rather may have disproportionate impacts on large ￿rm sectors (and less size-dispersed
sectors) (￿3 > 0 and ￿4 < 0). As a country is more ￿nancially developed, our model
predicts that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on growth decreases in the mean of the FSD
and increases in the dispersion of the FSD (￿5 < 0 and ￿6 > 0).
Our main results are presented in Table 4. The column (1) and (2) report the OLS esti-
27mates concerning the positive scale e⁄ect (￿1 > 0) and the negative adverse selection e⁄ect
(￿2 < 0). Regardless of including sector and country dummies, the regression results are
consistent with the ￿nding in Plehn-Dujowich (2009). The column (3) reports the slope-
coe¢ cient of the OLS estimates for the case including only ￿nancial development(Fk). The
result shows that the interaction between ￿nancial development and the mean of the FSD
(MEANi ￿ Fk) enters negatively and signi￿cantly (￿ 0.0887<0). The interaction between
￿nancial development and the dispersion of the FSD (SDi ￿ Fk) enters positively and sig-
ni￿cantly (0.100122>0). The impact of ￿nancial development on growth is decreasing in
the mean and increasing the dispersion of the FSD. The estimates may show potential bias
in seeing more ￿nancial development in richer places. It may bias the OLS estimate for
MEANi￿Fk upward and for SDi￿Fk downward. In column (4), the slope-coe¢ cients of the
IV estimates for the case including only ￿nancial development(Fk). They are also consistent
with the OLS results. These results suggest that ￿nancial development largely helps small
￿rm sectors (and more size-dispersed sectors), which is in the line with the previous lit-
erature on corporate ￿nance (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,
Laeven and Levine, 2008). Furthermore, these results cast insights concerning our pre-
diction, in that ￿nancial development matters to the disproportionate e⁄ect of ￿nancial
innovation on growth. The column (5) reports the slope-coe¢ cients of the IV estimate for
￿nancial innovation interacted with mean and dispersion of the FSD ( MEANi ￿ fk and
SDi ￿ fk.) in the absence of ￿nancial development. The result shows that MEANi ￿ fk
enters positively and signi￿cantly (0.7056>0). The interaction SDi ￿ fk enters negatively
but insigni￿cantly. Financial innovation itself has a larger impact on large ￿rm sectors.
To assess the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on growth depending on the country￿ s level
of ￿nancial development, we estimate our main regression framework (25) including two
interaction terms MEANi￿fk￿Fk and SDi￿fk￿Fk. Column (6) reports the slope-coe¢ cient
28IV estimates for the regression framework (25). The result shows that ￿nancial innovation
itself largely helps large ￿rm sectors (and less size-dispersed sectors) (￿3 = 1:340531 > 0
and ￿4 = ￿0:524278 < 0). However, the slope-coe¢ cients of the IV estimates for ￿nan-
cial innovation interacted with ￿nancial development, mean and dispersion of the FSD (
MEANi￿fk ￿Fk and SDi￿fk ￿Fk.) are consistent with our prediction for the main implica-
tion. The disproportionate impact of ￿nancial innovation on growth signi￿cantly decreases
in the mean of the FSD (￿5 = ￿2:401205 < 0) and signi￿cantly increases in the dispersion
of the FSD (￿6 = 2:22523 > 0). As the country is more ￿nancially developed, ￿nancial
innovation is more pronounced in small-￿rm sectors and more size-dispersed sectors within
small ￿rm sectors.
3.2.2 Controlling for Industry Characteristics
In this subsection, we control for additional industry traits. First, we were concerned that
sectors that are naturally heavy users of external ￿nance grow faster with higher levels
of ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial development. Given the in￿ uential ￿ndings of Rajan
and Zingales (1998), a ￿rm￿ s dependence on external ￿nance (RZ indexes; FIN DEP)
is de￿ned as the share of investment that cannot be ￿nanced through internal cash ￿ ows.
Assuming that the variance of the need for external ￿nance persists across sectors, we
use the United States to compute the natural external dependence of sectors. In Table
4, column (7) reports the slope-coe¢ cient IV estimates for the regression framework (25)
after controlling for the interaction terms between RZ indexes, Financial Innovation and
Financial Development (FIN DEP x F x f). The triple interaction term (FIN DEP
x F x f) enters positively and signi￿cantly. Financial innovation largely bene￿ts sectors
that are naturally heavy users of external ￿nance in more ￿nancially developed countries.
Second, ￿nancial development may disproportionately help sectors with good growth
29opportunities in competition with U.S. ￿rms. We control for US Sales Growth (US Sales),
which is calculated as real annual growth in net sales of U.S. ￿rms over the sample period
using data from COMPUSTAT. We add the interaction term of US Sales Growth with
Financial Development (US Sales x F). In Table 4, column (8) reports the slope-coe¢ cient
IV estimates for the regression framework (25) after controlling for the two interaction
terms FIN DEP x F x f and US Sales x F. FIN DEP x F x f enters positively and
signi￿cantly. US Sales x F enters negatively but insigni￿cantly.10
The column (7) and (8) show that the results for MEANi ￿fk ￿Fk and SDi ￿fk ￿Fk are
invariant and signi￿cant even when controlling for other industrial traits.
3.2.3 Sensitivity to Alternative Measures of Financial Development / Finan-
cial Innovation
The ￿ndings are also robust to using an alternative measure of ￿nancial intermediary de-
velopment. Speci￿cally, we use (i) the sum of Stock Market Capitalization and bank and
non-bank credit to the private sectors, (ii) Liquid Liabilities. We measure ￿nancial in-
novation by calculating the average growth of such alternative measures over the sample
periods. In Table 5, column (1) to (4) show the slope-coe¢ cient IV estimates for the
regression framework (25) when we use the sum of Private Credit and Stock Market Cap-
italization, divided by GDP. The Stock Market Capitalization equals the value of listed
shares of the stock market, used as an indicator of the size of the stock market. Column
(5) to (8) show the slope-coe¢ cient IV estimates for the regression framework (25) when
we use another alternative measure, liquid liabilities which is currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank ￿nancial intermediaries divided by GDP.
Liquid Liabilities simply measure the size of ￿nancial intermediaries and do not focus on
10When we add the interaction term US Sales x F x f to (25), it also enters insigi￿cantly.
30the intermediation of credit to the private sector. As shown in Table 5, the results hold
when using alternative measures of ￿nancial development.
3.2.4 Using dummies for the above 50 percentile Financial Development /
Financial Innovation
We examine the robustness of our ￿nding by using dummies for the above 50 percentile
Financial Development (Fk) and Financial Innovation (fk), instead of their own variables.
In Table 6, our main results for ￿5 and ￿6 of the regression framework (25) are unaltered.
The results are robust even when we use alternative measures of ￿nancial development and
￿nancial innovation.
3.2.5 Instruments Validity
We tested the strength of our instruments with the usual F-test of joint signi￿cance in
the ￿rst-stage regression of various instrument sets : MEANi ￿ Fk, SDi ￿ Fk, MEANi ￿
fk , SDi ￿ fk. The p-values reported in the bottom of Table 4 and 5 indicate that the
instruments passed this test at the 1 percent level in all equations for our implications.
Thus, our addition of the interacted instruments does not appear to have created a ￿many
instruments" problem.
To be valid, our instruments must not a⁄ect growth through any channel other than
￿nance, since otherwise the e⁄ects we are attributing to ￿nance might actually be e⁄ects
of these non￿nancial channels. We tested the restriction using the standard J test. For all
IV estimations, the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with IV residuals
are not rejected, and thereby the large p-values show that the instruments pass the test in
all cases.
Overall, we interpret the results of this section as robust evidence in favor of our
31implications. Although our empirical analysis is based on a short sample period 2002 to
2006, it still suggests that ￿nancial innovation largely helps small ￿rm sectors (and more
size-dispersed sectors) in more ￿nancially developed countries. In the absence of ￿nancial
development, ￿nancial innovation has rather a disproportionate impact on large ￿rm sectors
and (less size dispersed sectors).
4 Conclusion
Technological innovation has historically permitted ￿nancial intermediaries to interact with
real sectors more e¢ ciently. In this paper, we study the economic consequence of ￿nan-
cial innovation on small ￿rm sectors. We model the rate of ￿nancial innovation increases
more in sectors more informationally opaque and ￿nancially constrained, because a suc-
cessful ￿nancial entrepreneur earns high monopoly pro￿ts. In the model every screening
process becomes less e⁄ective to screen prospective entrepreneurs, as technology advances.
Due to complementarity between skill and technology frontier, an advance in technology
causes more distortions in small ￿rm sectors (and more size-dispersed sectors within small
￿rm sectors). Hence our model predicts that ￿nancial innovation is more pronounced in
small-￿rm sectors (and more size-dispersed sectors within small ￿rm sectors). Financial
development however still matters for the disproportionate impact of ￿nancial innovation
on small ￿rms sectors because ￿nancial entrepreneurs are more active in innovation in more
￿nancially developed countries.
Our empirical ￿ndings are consistent with the theoretical predictions In 22 sectors
spanning 24 European countries, over the sample period 2002-2006. Financial innovation
largely helps small ￿rm sectors in more ￿nancially developed countries. The link between
￿nancial innovation and the disproportionate impact on small ￿rm sectors is weak in less
￿nancially developed countries. The ￿ndings are unaltered even when controlling for other
32industrial traits and using alternative measures of ￿nancial intermediary development.
Incorporating ￿nancial innovation in growth theory, therefore appears an e⁄ective way
to examine the distributional impact of ￿nancial intermediaries across sectors and across
￿rms. Our result however does not reject the previous studies which emphasize a role of
￿nancial development in a growth process. Rather, this emphasizes the impact of ￿nan-
cial development on growth via ￿nancial innovation. In future work, we plan to assess
a disproportionate impact of the interaction between ￿nancial innovation and ￿nancial
development on growth, depending ￿rm age, entry and exit.
Appendix A: Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. : The proof follows the lines of Salanie (2005, Ch. 2.). We omit
time index t in this proof. Let UE(s;e s) = V (It(e s);s) ￿ Dt(e s) denote the expected income
of an entrepreneur of type s who announces his type as e s who announces his type as e s
. The entrepreneur announces the type e s that maximizes his expected income UE(s;e s).
For the mechanism (It(s);Dt(s)) to be incentive compatible , it must satisfy the ￿rst-order
condition(FOC) of the entrepreneur￿ s problem, @UE(s;s)=@e s = 0:
VI(I(s);s)Is(s) ￿ Ds(s) = 0; (B1)
and the second-order condition(SOC) of the entrepreneur￿ s problem, @2UE(s;s)=@e s2 ￿
0.
VII(I(s);s)(Is(s))2 + VI(I(s);s)Iss(s) ￿ Dss(s) ￿ 0. (B2)
33Di⁄erentiate the FOC (B1) with respect to s:
VII(I(s);s)(Is(s))2 + VIs(I(s);s)Is(s) + VI(I(s);s)Iss(s) ￿ Dss(s) = 0 (B3)
Applying to the SOC (B2), the SOC becomes
VIs(I(s);s)Is(s) ￿ 0 (B4)
we have VIs > 0: the return on R&D is greater the more skilled is the entrepreneur. This
is the "single-crossing property" familiar from the mechanism design literature, which here
is satis￿ed since entrepreneur skill and R&D are complement in the innovation production.
Let uE(s) denote the expected income the entrepreneur of type s gets at the optimum of
his program. As the optimal mechanism is truthful, we have
uE(s) = UE(s;s) = V (I(s);s) ￿ D(s) (B5)
Applying the envelope theorem, the FOC of the entrepreneur￿ s problem (B1) implies
that
duE(s)
ds
=
@V (I(s);s)
@s
, (B6)
which is positive. Integrating (B6), we obtain
uE(s) =
Z s
s
@V (I(y);y)
@y
dy, (B7)
34Combining (B5) and (B7), we infer the debt payment:
D(s) = V (I(s);s) ￿
Z s
s
@V (I(y);y)
@y
dy. (B8)
The objective function of the investor is
Z s
s
[D(s) ￿ I(s)]dF(s). (B9)
Substituting for D from (B8), the objective function (B9) becomes
Z s
s
[V (I(s);s) ￿
Z s
s
@V (I(y);y)
@y
dy ￿ I(s)]dF(s). (B10)
Integrating (B10) by parts, it becomes
Z s
s
[V (I(s);s) ￿ ￿(s)
@V (I(s);s)
@s
￿ I(s)]dF(s), (B11)
where ￿(s) is the inverse of the hazard rate of F. It follows that the investor￿ s problem
involves the point-wise maximization of the integrand, termed the "virtual surplus." The
FOC of the investor￿ s problem (11) yields other solutions (12) to (14). The debt payment
D may be recovered by integrating the FOC of the entrepreneur￿ s problem (B1) and using
the boundary condition (15).
Proof of Lemma 2. : The solution of the rate of ￿nancial innovation is
￿
f
t (i) =
￿￿(￿￿)1=(1￿￿)
s Z
s
￿(s)dF(s)
2￿f , (B12)
where ￿(s) = s1+g[f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿) ￿ f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)].
35Let ￿f(G) and ￿f(H) denote the rate of ￿nancial innovation associated with G and
H, respectively. Therefore, to prove ￿f(G) ￿ ￿f(H), we must show that the inequality
s Z
s
￿(s)dG(s) ￿
s Z
s
￿(s)dH(s) holds.
We ￿rst prove Part I. Because H ￿rst-order stochastically dominates G, we have
s Z
s
￿(s)dH(s) ￿
s Z
s
￿(s)dG(s), for every non-decreasing function ￿(s). Hence, to prove
the result, we must show that ￿(s) is non-increaseing. Taking its derivative with respect
to s, we obtain
￿0(s) = sgf1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)[(1 + g)A1 ￿ ￿s(
(￿(s) ￿ ￿0(s)s)=s2
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s
) (B13)
￿f(1 + g)(
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s
)
￿=(1￿￿)￿1
￿ 1g]
< (1 + g)sgf1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)fA1 ￿ ￿s(
(￿(s) ￿ ￿0(s)s)=s2
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s
)A2
< (1 + g)sgf1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)A1A2[1 ￿ ￿s(
(￿(s) ￿ ￿0(s)s)=s2
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s
]
where 0 < g < 1 ,
A1 = f1 ￿ (
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s
)
￿=(1￿￿)
g > 0
A2 = f(
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s
)
￿=(1￿￿)￿1
￿ 1g > 0
The inequality in the second row of (B13) holds because A1 < A2 by
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=s
< 1
For possible ranges of parameters, su¢ cient, but not necessary condition for ￿0(s) ￿ 0 to
be negative are assumption (A1) ( ￿0(s) < 0 ) and ￿ > ￿(s) where ￿(s) = max[￿
s￿￿(s)
￿0(s)s ],
36s 2 [s;s]. This condition implies that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation becomes trivial, as
￿ ! 0 , because R&D investment becomes trivial for technical innovation.
We next prove Part II. Because H second-order stochastically dominates G, we have
s Z
s
￿(s)dH(s) ￿
s Z
s
￿(s)dG(s), for every concave function ￿(s). Hence, to prove the result,
we must show that ￿(s) is convex. Taking the derivative of (B13) with respect to s, we
obtain
￿00(s) = g(1 + g)sg￿1B1 + ￿s1+gf
￿00(s)s2 + 2￿(s)s ￿ 2￿0(s)s2
s4 gB2 + [s1+g￿(1 ￿ 2￿)B3 (B14)
￿2(1 + g)￿sgB2](
￿(s) ￿ ￿0(s)s
s2 )
> g(1 + g)sg￿1B1 + ￿s1+gf
￿00(s)s2 + 2￿(s)s ￿ 2￿0(s)s2
s4 gB2 + [s1+g￿(1 ￿ 2￿)B4
￿2(1 + g)￿sgB2](
￿(s) ￿ ￿0(s)s
s2 )
> g(1 + g)sg￿1B1 + [￿s1+g + s1+g￿(1 ￿ 2￿) ￿ 2(1 + g)￿sg]B2
where
B1 = [f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿) ￿ f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)] > 0
B2 = [(1 + g)f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)￿1 ￿ f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)￿1] > 0
B3 = [(1 + g)2f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)￿2 ￿ f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)￿2] > 0
B4 = [(1 + g)f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)￿2 ￿ f1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(s)=sg￿=(1￿￿)￿2] > 0
and B2 < B4 < B3. The inequality in the forth row of (B14) holds because f
￿00(s)s2+2￿(s)s￿2￿0(s)s2)
s4 g >
(
￿(s)￿￿0(s)s
s2 ). For possible ranges of parameters, su¢ cient, but not necessary, conditions un-
der which ￿00(s) is positive are ￿ ￿ 1=2 , s > (1 + g)=(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿00(s) ￿ 0.
Proof of proposition 1. : For a simplicity, de￿ne ￿ as a change in parameters : a
decrease in mean and an increase in dispersion of entrepreneurial skill distribution F. By
37lemma 2, we know that
@￿f
@￿
> 0 and
@(￿s ￿ ￿u)
@￿
> 0 (B14)
By the positive scale e⁄ect and the negative adverse selection e⁄ect,
@￿u
@￿ < 0.
Take total di⁄erentiation of (23) with respect to ￿,
dass
d￿
= [
g(1 + g)
(g + ￿f(￿s ￿ ￿u) + ￿u)2][
@￿f
@￿
(￿s ￿ ￿u) + ￿f @(￿s ￿ ￿u)
@￿
+
@￿u
@￿
]
Hence dass
d￿ > 0; if
￿ ￿
￿
@￿f
@￿ (￿s ￿ ￿u) + ￿f @(￿s￿￿u)
@￿
￿ ￿
￿ >
￿ ￿
￿
@￿u
@￿
￿ ￿
￿; dass
d￿ < 0 ,otherwise.
Since both
@￿f
@￿ and ￿f is decreasing ￿f, the two properties of proposition 1 hold If the
country￿level of ￿nancial development is su¢ ciently high with low ￿f.
Proof of the Lemma : . "The advance in technology frontier dampens the rate of change
in technological innovation in the low skilled sectors and the more dispersed sectors"
How much the rate of change in technological innovation is dampend by technological
progress measured as:
(
@￿u
t (s)
@g
)=￿u
t (s) =
s Z
s
 (s)dF(s), (B15)
where  (s) = [ 1
(1+g)s ￿
￿2￿￿(s)=s
1￿(1￿￿)(1+g)￿(s)=s]. Let (
@￿u
t (G)
@g )=￿u
t (G) and (
@￿u
t (H)
@g )=￿u
t (H)
denote the rate of ￿nancial innovation associated with G and H, respectively. Suppose G
￿rst-order stochastically dominates H. The inequality
s Z
s
 (s)dG(s) ￿
s Z
s
 (s)dH(s) holds
, for every non-decreasing function  (s). To prove (
@￿u
t (G)
@g )=￿u
t (G) ￿ (
@￿u
t (H)
@g )=￿u
t (H), we
38must show that  (s) is non-decreasing. This holds by
 0(s) = ￿
1
(1 + g)s2 +
￿2￿(
￿(s)￿￿0(s)s
s2 )[1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]2 > 0 for s > 1 (B16)
Suppose G second-order stochastically dominates H, we have
s Z
s
 (s)dG(s) ￿
s Z
s
 (s)dH(s)
, for every concave function  (s). Hence, to prove the result, we must show that  (s) is
concave. Taking the derivative of (B16) with respect to s
 
00
(s) =
2
(1 + g)s3 ￿
￿2￿(
￿00(s)s2+2￿(s)s￿2￿0(s)s2
s4 )[1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]2
￿
￿2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)(
￿(s)￿￿0(s)s
s2 )2
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]2 ￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿2￿(
￿(s)￿￿0(s)s
s2 )2[1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)￿(s)=s]3
is negative for s > 1.
Appendix B: Data Appendix
￿ The "Weighted Mean" and "Weighted Standard Deviation" of Firm Size Distribution
:
Following Ace, Morck and Yeung (1999) and Pagano and Schivardi (2003), we con-
struct a measure of average ￿rm size that is employment-weighted. Let EMPLi
denote employment in industry i, FIRMij the number of ￿rms in size class j in
industry i, SHAREij the employment share of ￿rm size class j in industry i and
MEANij = EMPLij=FIRMij the average ￿rm size of class j in industry i. We have
￿ve ￿rm size classes based on the number of employees : 1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-249,
39and 250 or more. The "weighted average" ￿rm size:
MEANi =
5 X
j=1
SHAREijMEANij;
and the "weighted standard deviation" is our measure of dispersion
WSDi =
v u
u t
5 X
j=1
SHAREij(MEANij ￿ MEANi)2.
￿ External Dependence of Industries:
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we construct external dependence indexes over
the sample period by using COMPUSTAT data We calculate a ￿rm￿ s dependence on
external ￿nance as capital expenditure(COMPUSTAT #128) minus cash ￿ ow from
operations divided by capital expenditures. Cash ￿ ow from operation is de￿ned as
the sum of COMPUSTAT # 123,125,126,106, 213, 217.
￿ US Net Sale Growth :
We de￿ne US Net Sale Growth as growth in real sales, industry-level median of ￿rm
average growth rates over the sample period for US ￿rms, from COMPUSTAT.
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1Table 4: Regression results for the regression framework (25)
Dependent Variable Is Average Growth Rate Of Real Value Added Per Worker Over 2002 To 6
(1)OLS (2)OLS (3)OLS (4)IV
MEAN 0.090295 (2.54)** 0.06457 (2.53)** 0.125498 (3.25)*** 0.172663 (2.91)***
SD -0.10523 (-2.46)** -0.07092 (-2.35)** -0.13811 (-3.19)*** -0.22043 (-3.19)***
MEAN x F -0.0888 (-2.28)** -0.15726 (-2.14)**
SD x F 0.100122 (2.1)** 0.224302 (2.64)***
MEAN x f
SD x f
MEAN x F x f
SD x F x f
log of investment -0.00113 (-0.09) 0.011489 (0.67) 0.01351 (0.83) 0.0176 (1.13)
log of payroll 0.000502 (0.03) 0.002658 (0.14) 0.000821 (0.04) -0.00617 (-0.34)
log of VAD 2002 -0.01363 (-1.13) -0.21469 (-2.57)** -0.21708 (-2.56)** -0.21327 (-2.55)**
constant 0.080848 (0.96) -0.67608 (-1.88)* -0.71331 (-2.05) -0.77908 (-2.2)
1st-stage F test: L x MEAN 0
1st-stage F test: R x MEAN 0
1st-stage F test: L x WSD 0
1st-stage F test: R x WSD 0
country,industry dummy NO YES YES YES
R Square 0.128 0.4862 0.4965 0.5004
Num of Obs 336 336 336 336
(5)IV (6)IV (7)IV  (8)IV
MEAN 0.039776 (1.02) 0.146206 (2.1)** 0.157205 (2.27)** 0.159165 (2.29)**
SD -0.10452 (-2.03)** -0.23706 (-2.64)*** -0.24987 (-2.78)*** -0.25314 (-2.81)***
MEAN x F
SD x F
MEAN x f 0.705659 (2.04)** 1.340531 (3.51)*** 1.361703 (3.52)*** 1.298196 (3.17)***
SD x f -0.2756 (-0.97) -0.52428 (-1.83)* -0.49942 (-1.66)* -0.44184 (-1.4)
MEAN x F x f -2.40121 (-2.36)** -2.42983 (-2.5)** -2.42054 (-2.48)**
SD x F x f 2.22523 (2.33)** 2.193823 (2.44)** 2.193497 (2.43)**
FIN DEP x F x f 1.560761 (1.96)* 1.631145 (2.14)**
US SALES x F -0.39319 (-1.24)
log of investment 0.0159 (0.88) 0.026952 (1.39) 0.024635 (1.3) 0.016643 (0.8)
log of payroll 0.005121 (0.24) -0.02448 (-1.03) -0.02955 (-1.2) -0.01928 (-0.72)
log of VAD 2002 -0.23124 (-2.49)** -0.15453 (-3.08)*** -0.16275 (-3.33)*** -0.16102 (-3.27)***
constant -0.52426 (-1.36) 0.0629 (0.34) 0.126093 (0.69) 0.14298 (0.79)
1st-stage F test: L x MEAN 0 0 0 0
1st-stage F test: R x MEAN 0 0 0 0
1st-stage F test: L x WSD 0 0 0 0
1st-stage F test: R x WSD 0 0 0 0
country,industry dummy YES YES YES YES
R Square 0.5465 0.6258 0.6452 0.6476
Num of Obs 304 304 304 304
NOTE : t-statistics are in parentheses. We do not report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.   
* Singificance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. ***Idem., 1%.
The p-value of F-test of joint significant is reported in the fist-stage regression, 
FIN DEP is a measure of the industry's dependence of external dependence, based on the U.S. data.
US SALES is an industrt measure of sales growth over the sample period, based on the U.S. data.Table 5: IV  Regression Results : using other proxies for financial development/innovation
Dependent Variable Is Average Growth Rate Of Real Value Added Per Worker Over 2002 To 6
(1)credit+stock (2)credit+stock (3)credit+stock (4)credit+stock
MEAN 0.112326 (2.39)** 0.033026 (2.39)** 0.102537 (1.99)* 0.111303 (2.18)**
SD -0.1566 (-2.85)** -0.09034 (-2.85)*** -0.18957 (-2.71)*** -0.20004 (-2.89)***
MEAN x F -0.03885 (-1.07)
SD x F 0.075103 (1.92)*
MEAN x f 0.647529 (2.04)* 1.342025 (3.76)*** 1.305464 (3.5)***
SD x f -0.2473 (-0.97) -0.56184 (-2.16)** -0.49211 (-1.76)*
MEAN x F x f -1.50285 (-2.53)** -1.48049 (-2.68)***
SD x F x f 1.388836 (2.55)** 1.326135 (2.67)**
FIN DEP x F x f 2.153736 (2.33)**
US SALES x F -0.13829 (-0.9)
log of investment 0.015144 (0.92) 0.016614 (0.93) 0.029042 (1.41) 0.024241 (1.13)
log of payroll -0.00451 (-0.26) 0.007104 (0.34) -0.01156 (-0.48) -0.0112 (-0.43)
log of VAD 2002 -0.21397 (-2.59)** -0.22174 (-2.38)** -0.13579 (-3.04)*** -0.14541 (-3.32)***
constant -0.66283 (-1.91)* -0.6046 (-1.59)* -0.15516 (-0.86) -0.11729 (-0.68)
1st-stage F test: L 0 0 0 0
1st-stage F test: R 0 0 0 0
country,industry dummy YES YES YES YES
R Square 0.4988 0.5465 0.5001 0.658
Num of Obs 336 304 340 304
(5)liquid liabilities (6)liquid liabilities (7)liquid liabilities (8)liquid liabilities
MEAN 0.275634 (2.83)*** -0.0086 (-0.14) 0.162688 (1.21) 0.176535 (1.3)
SD -0.31938 (-2.92)*** -0.15135 (-2.34)** -0.36247 (-2.23)** -0.37375 (-2.29)**
MEAN x F -0.34811 (-2.6)***
SD x F 0.416375 (2.71)***
MEAN x f 4.228411 (2.04)** 4.841676 (2.43)** 4.772389 (2.25)**
SD x f -1.246 (-0.97) -0.90667 (-0.67) -0.6874 (-0.48)
MEAN x F x f -7.50245 (-2.01)** -7.88046 (-2.05)**
SD x F x f 7.321606 (1.85)* 7.378172 (1.86)*
FIN DEP x F x f 3.16678 (2.03)**
US SALES x F -0.70852 (-1.28)
log of investment 0.017972 (1.14) 0.017482 (0.97) 0.020192 (1.09) 0.012913 (0.63)
log of payroll -0.00194 (-0.11) 0.008269 (0.4) -0.00255 (-0.09) -0.00209 (-0.07)
log of VAD 2002 -0.21174 (-2.61)*** -0.21127 (-2.26)** -0.17104 (-2.11)** -0.16949 (-2.17)**
constant -0.77944 (-2.37)** -0.06919 (-0.15) 0.339531 (0.88) 0.486335 (1.33)
1st-stage F test: L  0 0 0 0
1st-stage F test: R 0 0 0 0
country,industry dummy YES YES YES YES
R Square 0.5047 0.5465 0.5859 0.6018
Num of Obs 336 304 304 304
NOTE : t-statistics are in parentheses. We do not report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.   
* Singificance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. ***Idem., 1%.
The p-value of F-test of joint significant is reported in the fist-stage regression, 
Column 1 to 4 reports the result when the sum of stock market capitalization and  private credit is used. 
Column 5 to 8 reports the result when liquid liabilities are used. 
FIN DEP is a measure of the industry's dependence of external dependence, based on the U.S. data.
US SALES is an industrt measure of sales growth over the sample period, based on the U.S. data.Table 6: OLS Regression Results : using dummies for financial development/innovation
Dependent Variable Is Average Growth Rate Of Real Value Added Per Worker Over 2002 To 6
(1) (2) (3) (4)credit+stock (5)credit+stock
MEAN 0.09906 (3.33)*** 0.043119 (3.4)*** 0.044739 (1.48) 0.107632 (3.21)*** 0.036913 (1.45)
SD -0.107891 (-3.3)*** -0.052377 (-3.45)*** -0.055111 (-1.39) -0.120296 (-3.13)*** -0.042897 (-1.34)
MEAN x F -0.077033 (-2.3)** -0.080035 (-2.27)**
SD x F 0.087279 (2.03)** 0.09419 (2.18)**
MEAN x f 0.044293 (1.3) 0.071915 (1.78)* 0.061979 (1.73)*
SD x f -0.040645 (-0.98) -0.072344 (-1.59) -0.063809 (-1.45)
MEAN x F x f -0.140464 (-3.34)***
SD x F x f 0.177154 (3.52)***
log of investment 0.010311 (0.68) 0.008246 (0.53) 0.011024 (0.73) 0.009681 (0.62) 0.00969 (0.62)
log of payroll 0.004633 (0.23) 0.007595 (0.39) 0.004133 (0.21) 0.005085 (0.26) 0.006691 (0.34)
log of VAD 2002 -0.207617 (-2.62)*** -0.206655 (-2.66)*** -0.207397 (-2.66)*** -0.205556 (-2.62)*** -0.208025 (-2.66)***
constant -0.705717 (-2.22)** -0.655725 (-2.06)** -0.657648 (-2.06)** -0.699505 (-2.11)** -0.679382 (-2.05)**
country,industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES
R Square 0.4954 0.4887 0.4998 0.4961 0.492
Num of Obs 340 340 340 340 340
(6)credit+stock (7)liquid liabilities (8)liquid liabilities (9)liquid liabilities
MEAN 0.03598 (1.39) 0.105936 (2.83)*** 0.052851 (1.96)* 0.053304 (2.04)**
SD -0.042684 (-1.32) -0.11138 (-2.71)*** -0.060418 (-2.05)** -0.064151 (-2.25)**
MEAN x F -0.090875 (-2.55)**
SD x F 0.087751 (2.3)**
MEAN x f 0.084317 (2.07)** 0.023211 (0.67) 0.061686 (1.36)
SD x f -0.090045 (-1.92)* -0.021063 (-0.52) -0.061531 (-1.22)
MEAN x F x f -0.160106 (-3.46)*** -0.139871 (-2.7)***
SD x F x f 0.231154 (3.67)*** 0.170815 (2.75)***
log of investment 0.00968 (0.61) 0.012912 (0.79) 0.00967 (0.59) 0.012822 (0.8)
log of payroll 0.006917 (0.35) 0.004192 (0.22) 0.004406 (0.23) 0.002602 (0.14)
log of VAD 2002 -0.209027 (-2.67)*** -0.205296 (-2.72)*** -0.201214 (-2.65)*** -0.199163 (-2.69)***
constant -0.695482 (-2.09)** -0.666007 (-2.08)** -0.631865 (-1.88)* -0.630363 (-1.89)*
country,industry dummy YES YES YES YES
R Square 0.5025 0.5047 0.4853 0.4987
Num of Obs 340 340 340 340
NOTE : t-statistics are in parentheses. We do not report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.   
* Singificance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. ***Idem., 1%.
The p-value of F-test of joint significant is reported in the fist-stage regression, 
Column 4 to 6 reports the result when the sum of stock market capitalization and  private credit is used. 
Column 7 to 9 reports the result when liquid liabilities are used. 